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ONLINE COMMUNITIES AS TERRITORIAL UNITS: PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER CYBERSPACE AFTER J. MCINTYRE 
MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
INTRODUCTION 
The term “cyberspace” was coined by science fiction author William 
Gibson in his 1982 short story Burning Chrome1 and was later popularized in 
his debut novel Neuromancer, published in 1984.2 In Gibson’s vision, 
cyberspace was a three-dimensional realm that computer hackers entered by 
implanting electrodes into their foreheads.3 By navigating computer networks 
with their thoughts, hackers could break into servers, steal electronic data, and 
commit various other cybercrimes without lifting a finger.4 
Even though Gibson’s original vision of cyberspace will likely remain a 
fiction for the foreseeable future, it is hard to overstate the internet’s impact on 
the lives of everyday people. In 2010, the average American spent thirty-two 
hours per month in cyberspace,5 and not all of that time was spent on frivolous 
entertainment. Commerce conducted through the internet, styled “e-
commerce,” makes up a substantial portion of the American economy. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, a total of 3.371 trillion dollars’ worth of 
goods purchased through e-commerce were shipped in the United States in 
2009, totaling 16.8% of the value of all goods shipped that year.6 
But with every innovation comes a new set of legal challenges. The 
internet has been exploited in illegal enterprises ranging from piracy of music7 
 
 1. Scott Thill, March 17, 1948: William Gibson, Father of Cyberspace, WIRED.COM (Mar. 
17, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/thisdayintech/2011/03/0317cyberspace-author-will 
iam-gibson-born; see also William Gibson, Burning Chrome, OMNI, July 1982, at 72. 
 2. Thill, supra note 1; see also WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984) (“Cyberspace. 
A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every 
nation . . . .”). 
 3. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 55. 
 4. Id. at 55–69. 
 5. Average Time Spent Online per U.S. Visitor in 2010, COMSCORE DATA MINE (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2011/01/average-time-spent-online-per-u-s-visitor-in-
2010. 
 6. E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 26, 2011), http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/ 
2009/2009reportfinal.pdf. 
 7. See generally Megan M. LaBelle, The “Rootkit Debacle”: The Latest Chapter in the 
Story of the Recording Industry and the War on Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 79 (2006) 
(providing a thorough, pre-2006 history of the recording industry’s war on file sharing). 
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to drug trafficking8 and distribution of child pornography.9 While these issues 
have received a great deal of attention from the popular press, some legal 
commentators have been more fascinated with the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts in cases involving internet communications.10 The most well-known 
case addressing this subject, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc.,11 remains one of the most frequently cited federal district court cases in 
history.12 Yet all of the judges, attorneys, and law professors who have 
discussed this problem have yet to reach any real consensus as to how it should 
be solved. Commentators attempting to shoehorn the internet into the 
framework of International Shoe Co. v. Washington13 have recommended tests 
ranging from multifactor targeting tests14 to causation tests that examine the 
strength of the causal connection between internet-based communications and 
the plaintiff’s cause of action.15 Most recently, in the 2011 case J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,16 Justice Breyer’s concurrence expressed a 
willingness to change the prevailing doctrines to address the issues raised by 
internet commerce, but declined to do so because J. McIntyre “d[id] not 
present any of those issues.”17 
In spite of the volume of commentary that has been written on this subject, 
no one seems to have addressed perhaps the most difficult challenge to 
personal jurisdiction posed by modern technology: that of disputes arising 
between members of online communities. In the early 1990s, a typical website 
 
 8. See Adrian Chen, Underground Website Lets You Buy Any Drug Imaginable, 
WIRED.COM (June 1, 2011, 2:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/silkroad 
(discussing the underground e-marketplace Silk Road, which lives on a secreted part of the 
internet accessible only through a network of proxy servers called Tor and is one of most 
notorious examples of internet-based drug trafficking). 
 9. See Joanna Glasner, P2P Taken to Task for Child Porn, WIRED.COM (Sept. 9, 2003), 
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2003/09/60368 (noting that the same peer-to-peer file 
sharing networks that have been used for illegal distribution of music have also been used for 
distribution of child pornography). 
 10. See, e.g., Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal 
Jurisdiction over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133 (2009). 
 11. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 12. See Haynes, supra note 10, at 155 n.145 (“According to Westlaw, Zippo has been cited 
in over 600 court decisions and 648 law review articles in the twelve years since the decision.”). 
As of this writing, Westlaw’s KeyCite service lists a total of 4,782 citing references for Zippo. 
 13. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 14. Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1384–404 (2001); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital 
Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (combining Zippo with the Calder 
effects test). 
 15. Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction and 
the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1838–44 (2003). 
 16. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 17. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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was little more than a two-way broadcast medium where website operators 
could distribute information to users, and users could submit limited amounts 
of information back to the website operators.18 Today, many websites are 
designed as digital spaces whose occupants are culturally connected, much like 
neighbors in a geographic community. When transactions are conducted or 
torts are committed in these digital spaces, it makes little sense to analyze the 
events as if they take place inside a forum state. Rather, they actually take 
place in cyberspace, a non-physical interactive realm that cannot be fixed at a 
given location.19 The Supreme Court has yet to make room for the unique 
attributes of cyberspace in the law of personal jurisdiction, and based on the J. 
McIntyre decision, it appears that the Court never will. This Comment will 
suggest that personal jurisdiction rules should be changed to accommodate the 
reality of cyberspace, and that it is up to Congress to do so by expanding the 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts to cover certain state-law claims 
arising from online communities. 
Part I briefly reviews relevant highlights in the evolution of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine through the dawn of the World Wide Web. Part II 
discusses the nature of online communities and the challenge they pose. Part 
III analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in the 2011 J. 
McIntyre case and predicts that the judiciary will not modify Fourteenth 
Amendment law to accommodate online communities. Finally, Part IV 
proposes a cyberterritorial model of jurisdiction and identifies some possible 
challenges in implementing this model. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
One of the first steps toward the modern personal jurisdiction paradigm 
was made in 1927 when the Supreme Court decided Hess v. Pawloski.20 Fifty 
years earlier, the Court had famously held in Pennoyer v. Neff that a state court 
could not establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-consenting 
defendant unless the defendant had been lawfully served inside the forum 
state’s borders.21 In Hess, the Court heard a challenge to a Massachusetts 
statute providing that when a non-resident motorist is sued for an act of motor 
vehicle negligence committed on a Massachusetts public roadway, the plaintiff 
 
 18. At the genesis of the World Wide Web in 1992, interactivity was limited to hyperlinks. 
See WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/History/19921103-hypertext/hyper 
text/WWW/MarkUp/Tags.html (last visited June 27, 2012) (reproducing the Web’s very first 
site); Matt Blum, 20 Years Ago Today: The First Website Is Published, WIRED.COM (Aug. 6, 
2011, 8:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/geekdad/2011/08/world-wide-web-20-years. 
 19. William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the 
Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 198 (1995). 
 20. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 21. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). 
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may employ substitute service on the state registrar in lieu of personally 
serving the foreign defendant.22 Even though this statute fell outside the 
boundaries of Pennoyer, the Court upheld it in light of the “serious dangers to 
persons and property” posed by automobiles, and the state’s accompanying 
interest in promoting safe driving and helping its citizens obtain convenient 
relief for injuries inflicted by non-resident motorists.23 
The most famous personal jurisdiction case decided by the Supreme Court, 
and the case that defines the modern paradigm, is the 1945 case of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.24 International Shoe replaced the formal 
jurisdictional categories of Pennoyer with the principle that a state may 
exercise jurisdiction whenever the defendant has “certain minimum contacts 
with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”25 
An important refinement of International Shoe’s minimum contacts test 
came in Hanson v. Denckla,26 which held that jurisdiction requires “some act 
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”27 In Hanson, the only contact between the defendant, a Delaware 
bank, and the forum state of Florida was that the bank had been named trustee 
of a trust whose beneficiary later moved to Florida.28 The Court explained that 
“unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident 
defendant,” such as the beneficiary’s decision to move to Florida, “cannot 
satisfy” the minimum contacts test.29 
Kulko v. Superior Court30 illustrates the flexibility of the minimum 
contacts test. The defendant, a divorced New York resident, was named as a 
party in his ex-wife’s action in a California court.31 The action sought to 
establish a divorce decree obtained in Haiti as a California judgment and to 
modify its terms as to visitation and child support.32 Before the action was 
filed, the defendant’s only contacts with California were that he consented to 
his daughter living there for the school year, that he purchased his daughter a 
plane ticket from New York to California, and that he had two brief military 
 
 22. Hess, 274 U.S. at 353–54. 
 23. Id. at 356–57. 
 24. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 25. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 26. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 27. Id. at 253. 
 28. Id. at 252. 
 29. Id. at 253. 
 30. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
 31. Id. at 87–88. 
 32. Id. at 88. 
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stopovers there many years prior.33 On these facts, the Supreme Court’s 
holding that California could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant34 may 
have been somewhat predictable. Nonetheless, the opinion is noteworthy for its 
rationale that jurisdiction “would impose an unreasonable burden on family 
relations, and one wholly unjustified by the ‘quality and nature’ of appellant’s 
activities in or relating to the State of California.”35 Kulko demonstrates that 
the circumstances surrounding the litigation, including the relationship 
between the parties, can change the threshold at which the minimum contacts 
test will allow a state court to exercise jurisdiction.36 
The 1977 case of Shaffer v. Heitner37 reinforced the importance of the 
values of fair play and substantial justice, and also emphasized that 
fundamental fairness is at the core of Fourteenth Amendment due process.38 At 
issue in Shaffer was the Delaware court’s exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction 
over the defendants’ shares of stock in Greyhound, a Delaware corporation.39 
In reversing the Delaware high court, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the 
notion that “an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an 
assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property” was a “fiction . . . 
support[ing] an ancient form without substantial modern justification” and that 
“[i]ts continued acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction 
that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.”40 Though he gave due 
consideration to the long history of quasi in rem jurisdiction,41 Justice Marshall 
had no qualms about overturning a jurisdictional rule that had existed for over 
a century. He wrote that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
“can be as readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no 
longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are inconsistent with 
the basic values of our constitutional heritage.”42 For these reasons, the Court 
held that a state’s power over property within its borders is not absolute, and 
 
 33. Id. at 87, 90. 
 34. Id. at 101. 
 35. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 
(1945)). 
 36. The Court also emphasized that the Due Process Clause can allow for flexible tests, but 
still imposes a meaningful limitation on state court jurisdiction. Id. at 101 (“We therefore believe 
that the state courts in the instant case failed to heed our admonition that the flexible standard of 
International Shoe does not heral[d] the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 37. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 38. See id. at 211. 
 39. Id. at 191–92. 
 40. Id. at 212. 
 41. Id. at 211–12 (“This history must be considered as supporting the proposition that 
jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property satisfies the demands of due process but it is 
not decisive.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 42. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. 
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that state courts’ use of quasi in rem jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum 
contacts test.43 
One lesson that should be drawn from the history of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine is that the Court has, starting in the twentieth century, employed a 
culture-sensitive analysis. Whereas Pennoyer was decided based on 
“principle[s] of general, if not universal, law,”44 later decisions acknowledged 
the realities of modern life and sought to replace rules that would unjustifiably 
deprive plaintiffs of a fair opportunity to obtain relief (such as in Hess), or that 
would unreasonably burden defendants’ ability to own intangible property 
(such as in Shaffer), or maintain familial relationships across state lines (such 
as in Kulko). Since the Due Process Clause did not require the Court to turn a 
blind eye to the dangers of the automobile,45 the interests of investors,46 and 
the needs of families affected by divorce,47 there should also be no obstacle to 
the Court giving full consideration to the cultural and commercial changes 
brought about by the advent of online communities. 
Starting in the mid-90s, lower courts attempted to give that consideration 
to internet-based commerce. Best known among such cases is the district court 
case of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., decided in 1997.48 
While Zippo has not received universal approval,49 it remains one of the only 
cases that has attempted to create a new conceptual framework to address 
internet-related personal jurisdiction issues. At issue in Zippo was an internet 
domain name dispute between Zippo Manufacturing (“Manufacturing”), the 
maker of the well-known Zippo pocket lighters, and Zippo Dot Com (“Dot 
Com”), a company that sold access to internet newsgroups.50 Manufacturing 
filed suit against Dot Com in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
that the court had jurisdiction based primarily on the fact that 3000 
Pennsylvania residents subscribed to Dot Com’s newsgroup service.51 
The court proposed a sliding scale that would assign weight to contacts 
made via a website based on the website’s level of interactivity.52 At the low 
end of the spectrum are “passive” websites that simply “make information 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). 
 45. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927). 
 46. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. 
 47. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978). 
 48. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 49. See, e.g., Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2007) (“We disagree with the arbitrary ‘sliding scale’ approach adopted by Zippo Manufacturing 
Co. . . . .”). 
 50. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1124. 
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available to those who are interested in it.”53 At the high end of the spectrum 
are “situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet” and 
“enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the 
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet.”54 In 
the middle are “interactive” sites where users “can exchange information with 
the host computer.”55 At the high end, jurisdiction is proper; at the low end, 
jurisdiction is not proper; in the middle, “jurisdiction is determined by 
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of 
information that occurs” on the site.56 Applying this sliding scale to the case at 
hand, the court determined that Dot Com was “doing business over the 
Internet,” and had therefore purposefully availed itself of the opportunity to do 
business in Pennsylvania, making itself subject to a Pennsylvania court’s 
jurisdiction.57 
Dot Com may have been a typical internet business from the mid-90s, but 
online commerce takes on many different forms today. The form that poses the 
greatest challenge to the law of personal jurisdiction is commerce conducted 
not between the users and the owner of a particular website, but between 
members of online communities. 
II.  WILLIAM GIBSON VINDICATED: ONLINE COMMUNITIES AND CYBERSPACE 
Thirty years after its first use, Gibson’s term “cyberspace” has now been 
vindicated. The internet is a non-physical space, complex and organic, in 
which users from all over the world can interact and exchange information. 
One of the best illustrations of the nature of online communities is the popular 
website Reddit, which had more than thirty-four million unique users in 
December 2011.58 Reddit’s design is roughly a cross between a social 
bookmarking website and an online discussion forum. Users submit links to 
other websites containing content that they think other users will find 
interesting, useful, or entertaining.59 Other Reddit users can then weigh in by 
participating in a comment thread attached to the link or by using Reddit’s 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 1125–26. 
 58. Erik Martin, 2 Billion & Beyond, THE REDDIT BLOG (Jan. 5, 2012, 8:14 AM), 
http://blog.reddit.com/2012/01/2-billion-beyond.html. 
 59. See Frequently Asked Questions, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/help/faq (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2012). Users can also submit self-posts, which are comment threads that begin with a 
message written by the submitter instead of a link to another website. See Help, REDDIT, 
http://www.reddit.com/help/submitting (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
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trademark voting system, which consists of the submission of a binary 
“upvote” or “downvote.”60 
What makes Reddit different from older sites like Digg, Slashdot, and 
Delicious is the fact that Reddit is divided into more than 100,000 subsections 
called subreddits.61 Each subreddit is devoted to a certain subject, ranging from 
broad topics such as politics,62 humor,63 and music,64 to specific niche topics 
such as particular hobbies,65 television shows,66 and cities.67 The more well-
populated and well-developed subreddits constitute communities in a sense 
that should have significance in the context of personal jurisdiction. This is 
because larger subreddits have their own rules of conduct,68 shared culture, and 
interactive proximity69 between members of the community. Each of these 
three attributes ties in to the thinking that underlies personal jurisdiction 
caselaw. 
First, the courts’ references to a state’s need to protect its citizens from 
out-of-state bad actors indicate a certain level of territoriality, or perhaps even 
shades of an in-group versus out-group mentality.70 Online communities’ rules 
 
 60. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 59. 
 61. Fernando Alfonso III, You Know What’s Cool? 100,000 Subreddits, THE DAILY DOT 
(Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.dailydot.com/news/reddit-100000-subreddit-milestone. 
 62. See Politics, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/politics (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 63. See Funny, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/funny (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 64. See Music, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/music (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 65. See Crochet, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/crochet (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 66. See Game of Thrones–The HBO Series & All Things GRRM, REDDIT, http://www.red 
dit.com/r/gameofthrones (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 67. See StLouis, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/stlouis (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 68. For example, the TwoXChromosomes subreddit, which is dedicated to women’s issues, 
specifically bans “hatred, bigotry, . . . misogyny, misandry, transphobia, [and] homophobia.” 
TwoXChromosomes, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/twoxchromosomes (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012). A more unusual example is the notorious ShitRedditSays subreddit, in which users 
document instances of racism, sexism, or otherwise offensive behavior by other users. The 
moderators of ShitRedditSays frequently ban commenters for arguing that the documented 
behavior is not offensive. [META] SRS FAQ, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/ShitRedditSays/ 
comments/o0pdv/meta_srs_faq (last visited Mar. 28, 2012). 
 69. The phrase “interactive proximity” refers to the fact that any content posted to a 
subreddit is likely to be read by any user who frequents that subreddit. In fact, a user who 
subscribes to a subreddit need not deliberately navigate to that subreddit to see its content. Upon 
logging in, a user sees a customized front page with the top-rated posts from all of that user’s 
subscribed subreddits. Thus, users are exposed to high-rated content without having to seek it out. 
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 59. 
 70. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 718 (1st Cir. 1996) (“As the 
district court noted, Massachusetts has a strong interest in protecting its citizens from out-of-state 
solicitations for goods or services that prove to be unsafe . . . .”); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 
S.W.3d 389, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (comparing an out-of-state bad actor to a “tortfeasor who 
mails a thousand bombs to recipients in one state, and one to recipients in each of the other forty-
nine states” (quoting C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of 
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of conduct represent a similar attempt to shield the community from miscreants 
and to fence it off from the rest of the internet. Second, shared culture, such as 
common interests and political or personal beliefs, indicate that any given 
online community could potentially represent a discrete market to an 
enterprising business, a market of which a business could purposefully avail 
itself, as the Court wrote in Hanson v. Denckla.71 Third, because of the 
interactive proximity inherent in an online community, an advertisement or 
other public commercial activity that reaches one member of an online 
community is likely to reach a large portion of that community, just as an 
advertisement in a regional newspaper will reach a large portion of that 
region’s citizens. In light of these three observations, an online community is 
not entirely out of place in the context of personal jurisdiction. It is often said 
that lawyers and judges are conservative by nature,72 and to a conservative 
mind, it might seem outlandish to compare a website to one of the fifty states. 
But as technology continues to spread and more daily activities move from the 
physical world into cyberspace, it will become more natural to think of an 
online community as simply another type of territory in which people spend 
their time. 
On one hand, the similarities between online communities and traditional 
communities suggest that online communities should have a place in personal 
jurisdiction doctrine. On the other hand, the differences between the two 
dictate that cyberspace cannot be treated like traditional modes of 
communication that cross state lines. Cyberspace is unique, and it requires a 
unique approach. 
The most fundamental difference—and perhaps the most obvious one—is 
that while a traditional community has a fixed location, cyberspace is both 
everywhere and nowhere all at once. When a user stores information, digital 
goods, or other data in the internet, that data can typically be accessed from 
any place in the world with an active internet connection. Cellular networks 
now offer data coverage to a large percentage of the continental United States, 
including most major metropolitan areas,73 which means that many Americans 
can be connected to the internet literally every second of the day. At the same 
time, it would be a fallacy to say that the internet, or data stored in the internet, 
 
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and 
Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 659 (2006))) (“[I]f you pick a fight in Missouri, you can reasonably 
expect to settle it here.”); LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 735 N.E.2d 883, 889 (N.Y. 2000) 
(“Considering that Pak-Mor’s long business arm extended to New York, it seems only fair to 
extend correspondingly the reach of New York’s jurisdictional long-arm.”). 
 71. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 72. Thomas M. Steele, The MacCrate Report: Its Impact on Education in Law Firm 
Management, 23 PACE L. REV. 613, 613 (2003). 
 73. See, e.g., AT&T Coverage Viewer, AT&T, http://www.wireless.att.com/coverageviewer/ 
#?type=voice (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
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is found in any one particular location. Most of the world’s largest internet 
companies have multiple redundant data centers,74 so for any individual piece 
of data, chances are good that it is not stored at any one single location at all. 
Moreover, even if each piece of data could be localized to a single server or a 
single storage device, the location of that device is typically both unknown and 
irrelevant to the user. 
The fact that online activities are not fixed at a particular point in space 
frustrates attempts to analyze online interactions as if they take place in a 
forum state. When a Californian and a New Yorker communicate online, it 
makes little sense to say that the Californian reaches into New York, or vice-
versa. Rather, the Californian and the New Yorker have both made a conscious 
decision to enter a place that is neither California nor New York. The two truly 
are interacting in cyberspace, and if personal jurisdiction rules are to keep up 
with the changing cultural landscape, the law will have to develop an 
understanding of what online communities are and develop rules to assign 
jurisdiction based on what happens in cyberspace.75 
Before 2009, one of the last ties that necessarily remained between an 
online transaction and the physical world was the exchange of traditional 
money—i.e., a government-backed currency. Today, online transactions can 
now take place without the use of a bank or any traditional currency. While 
electronic bank transfers and home banking services are nothing new,76 the 
twenty-first century has seen the invention of the first electronic peer-to-peer 
currency system, called Bitcoin.77 A unit of Bitcoin currency, eponymously 
 
 74. See, e.g., 4.5. Data Redundancy, RACKSPACE HOSTING, http://docs.rackspace.com/files/ 
api/v1/cf-intro/content/Data_Redundancy-d1e258.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) (noting that 
web hosting giant Rackspace maintains at least three redundant copies of every file stored with its 
Cloud Files data storage service). 
 75. In 1999, one commentator actually mentioned what he called the “cyberspace model” of 
internet contacts, which would hold that internet contacts exist only in cyberspace and not in any 
particular state. Richard Philip Rollo, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: It Is Time for 
a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 693 (1999). This is the central premise of the model I will 
propose. However, Rollo wrote that to adopt the cyberspace model “would be to deprive all 
courts of jurisdiction over the Internet.” Id. This is the case only if the minimum contacts analysis 
remains blind to litigants’ contacts with non-physical spaces, such as online communities. As will 
be discussed infra, there is no elegant way to translate a series of cyberspace contacts into a grant 
of jurisdiction to a particular court, but an inelegant solution is better than no solution at all. See 
infra Part V. 
 76. See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The Business of Banking: Looking to 
the Future—Part II, 52 BUS. LAW. 1279, 1304, 1309 (1997). 
 77. The design of the Bitcoin system was announced in a paper published online under the 
pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). The true identity of 
Bitcoin’s creator, or creators, has never been definitively proven. See Joshua Davis, The Crypto-
Currency, NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 62. 
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called a bitcoin, is nothing more than a block of electronic data.78 Each bitcoin 
is stored redundantly at multiple points throughout the network of computers 
and servers running the Bitcoin client software.79 Every bitcoin has its own 
transaction history digitally encoded in the bitcoin itself, and the last 
transaction in this history is used to determine ownership of the bitcoin.80 
Among the purported benefits of the Bitcoin system is the fact that a Bitcoin 
transaction need not pass through any centralized clearinghouse.81 In fact, there 
is no central Bitcoin authority at all,82 and every computer running the Bitcoin 
software (called a “node”) has exactly the same level of authority as every 
other node.83 
It is undeniable that a bitcoin is “real money.” Hundreds of online 
merchants accept bitcoins for purchase of digital goods and services including 
web hosting, graphic design, and e-books, as well as physical goods ranging 
from beef jerky to firearms.84 There are also dozens of online currency 
exchanges where bitcoins can be exchanged for government-issued 
currencies.85 Now that an online transaction involving the exchange of money 
for digital goods or services need not even use a bank or a currency issued by 
any government, ties between cyberspace and physical space have been even 
further loosened and weakened. This further demonstrates that personal 
jurisdiction law misses an increasingly important aspect of life in the twenty-
first century if it does not understand the unique qualities of online 
communities.86 
To round out the distinction between cyberspace and physical space, 
certain types of injuries—and, by extension, the associated causes of action—
should be viewed as injuries sustained in cyberspace. Another important 
cyberspace phenomenon is that of digital goods. Prominent examples include 
 
 78. Nakamoto, supra note 77 (“We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital 
signatures.”). 
 79. Id. (explaining how transactions are broadcast to many nodes throughout the Bitcoin 
network). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82.  Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN CENTRAL, https://en.bitcoin-central.net/s/faq (last 
updated Feb. 23, 2012). 
 83. Nakamoto, supra note 77 (“Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote.”). 
 84. See Trade, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade (last visited Feb. 17, 2012) 
(listing hundreds of online merchants accepting Bitcoin currency). 
 85. See id. (listing dozens of currency exchanges that trade in Bitcoin currency). 
 86. As of this writing, only one in-depth analysis of the legal status of Bitcoin has been 
published. See Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012). Grinberg argues that Bitcoin could be considered a 
security, making it subject to federal securities regulations. Id. at 194–204. 
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the exchange of virtual items in online games such as Second Life.87 Many 
players buy and sell items such as virtual clothing or in-game currency from 
other players in exchange for traditional money.88 Though the phrase “digital 
goods” is usually used to refer to this type of virtual object,89 it could also be 
applied to items transacted in other contexts. For example, users of the 
Amazon Kindle e-reader can purchase books from Amazon.com’s Kindle 
Store, and then download and read those books on a wide variety of devices, 
including smartphones, laptops and the Kindle itself.90 The Kindle Store 
customer has purchased a discrete “thing,” but it is a “thing” that cannot be 
localized to a particular object. At the same time, the purchased item can be 
accessed and used from almost any electronic device equipped with an internet 
connection. Is an e-book, then, any less of a digital good than a Second Life 
house? Digital goods are significant because they allow a wide variety of 
transactions in the nature of a sale to take place without either party delivering 
or receiving a physical chattel in any particular forum state.91 As such, when a 
transaction in digital goods goes awry, the injury is really suffered in 
cyberspace, not in any particular state.92 
A second class of online injuries includes injuries to a person’s reputation 
in an online community. eBay, for example, uses a feedback system that allows 
users to assign ratings to buyers and sellers.93 The very purpose of this system 
is to allow users to avoid doing business with other users who have poor 
feedback ratings, so for a person who derives a substantial portion of his or her 
income from transactions conducted on eBay,94 the threat of economic injury 
due to false statements made through the eBay feedback system is very real. 
 
 87. See Shop: Frequently Asked Questions, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/shop/faq/ 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 88. Id. Linden Lab, the creator of Second Life, runs its own digital goods marketplace. 
Second Life Marketplace, SECOND LIFE, https://marketplace.secondlife.com (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012). 
 89. See, e.g., Bettina M. Chin, Note, Regulating Your Second Life: Defamation in Virtual 
Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (2007). 
 90. Free Kindle Apps, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/feature.html?ie=UTF8& 
docId=1000493771 (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
 91. This fact also renders the Calder effects test inapplicable. See infra notes 105–06 and 
accompanying text. 
 92. In fact, thanks to Bitcoin, the would-be plaintiff no longer necessarily suffers a loss in 
his or her physical pocketbook or bank account. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Feedback, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2012). 
 94. In 2009, eBay claimed that 1.3 million people relied on eBay as a primary or secondary 
source of income. Letter from Daniel Dougherty, Senior Dir. of Intellectual Prop., eBay, to Office 
of the General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office (Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.cop 
yright.gov/1201/2008/responses/ebay-inc-28.pdf. 
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Admittedly, in no known case has a plaintiff successfully pursued a libel in 
which the alleged injury was an injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in an online 
community—a “cyberlibel” claim, perhaps. But it does not take a wild 
imagination to foresee that such litigation could begin en masse any time. 
There are numerous online communities that are dedicated to facilitating 
transactions between users.95 As technology continues to change the world’s 
cultural landscape and becomes more tightly integrated into everyday life, the 
potential demand for online peer-to-peer transactions will only increase. In 
fact, some commentators, such as media theorist Douglas Rushkoff, see peer-
to-peer value exchange as part of a movement that will bring about broad-
based social and economic changes.96 If Rushkoff’s ideas take hold, it is quite 
possible that the majority of online transactions will eventually be transactions 
between website users rather than transactions between a user and a website 
operator, such as Amazon.com or another large e-commerce company. 
Moreover, it is likely that the courts have yet to see a deluge of cyberlibel 
claims arising out of eBay transactions merely because eBay has such an 
effective feedback system.97 Increased demand for online exchanges of goods 
and services will further increase the number of online marketplaces, and 
chances are good that some smaller marketplaces will not have a feedback 
system as effective as eBay’s. This will increase the likelihood that a malicious 
user will succeed in defaming a fellow user, thereby forcing that user to seek a 
remedy through the courts.98 
In summation, we now live in a world where people from different states 
can have an interaction in a non-physical space that is not inside any one U.S. 
state, in which they exchange real money without using any bank or 
government-backed currency, and in which one of the parties suffers an injury 
that does not happen in the physical world. If the law clings to old doctrines 
and old ways of thinking, then the law will turn a blind eye to the realities of 
 
 95. See, e.g., About, ETSY, http://www.etsy.com/about?ref=ft_about (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012); Who We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). On a 
related note, acts of tortious interference with business relationships committed in one of these 
communities might fit into a category with acts of cyberlibel in that both types of torts cause 
injuries in cyberspace. 
 96. Douglas Rushkoff, Keynote Address at Web 2.0 Expo: Radical Abundance: How We 
Get Past “Free” and Learn to Exchange Value Again (Nov. 18, 2009), http://futurismic.com/2009/ 
11/23/rushkoff-on-radical-abundance-and-the-economics-of-web-cubed/. 
 97. See Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce 
and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847, 856 (2003) (noting that eBay’s feedback system 
proved to be a substantial success). 
 98. However, not all websites that are used to sell goods need necessarily be part of the 
cyberterritorial theory outlined below. Craigslist, for example, is divided into hundreds of 
regional subsections. See Cities, CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/sites (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2012). Thus, Craigslist is really an extension of geographic communities rather than a 
true online community. 
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the web. The values of fair play and substantial justice extolled in International 
Shoe cannot be served unless the law is grounded in a lucid understanding of 
online communities. Some analytical framework for understanding online 
interactions is needed. 
Could this framework come from a readaptation of existing caselaw? Two 
doctrines that have been applied to internet-based contacts are the Zippo 
sliding scale test99 and the Calder effects test.100 Unsurprisingly, neither can be 
molded into a form that is applicable to online communities. The problems 
with Zippo are threefold. First, the sliding scale applies only to assertions of 
jurisdiction over a party operating a website, not over users of websites.101 
Second, the language used in Zippo suggests that the sliding scale is 
fundamentally inapposite to interactions taking place in online communities. 
The court wrote that at the high end of the sliding scale are “situations where a 
defendant clearly does business over the Internet.”102 The court also framed the 
issue as a question of “the Constitutionally permissible reach of Pennsylvania’s 
Long Arm Statute . . . through cyberspace.”103 The court’s choice of the 
prepositions “over” and “through” shows that the sliding scale test understands 
the internet as simply another point-to-point communication medium. 
Cyberspace is far more than a sophisticated successor to mail, telegraph, and 
telephone, and it needs a model of jurisdiction that reflects its true nature. 
Third, Zippo is readily distinguishable on its facts from any case arising from 
an online community. Specifically, the defendant chose to contract with 
Pennsylvania internet service providers (ISPs) to allow the ISPs’ customers to 
access the defendant’s services.104 Contracts with these regional ISPs were 
physical-world contacts arising from the defendant’s desire to expand into a 
particular regional market. Dot Com’s contacts with the state of Pennsylvania 
were therefore the type of traditional regional business contacts anticipated in 
International Shoe, not true cyberspace contacts. Thus, Zippo did not address 
any of the issues raised by cases involving peer-to-peer cyberspace 
transactions or cyberlibel claims. 
The Calder effects test, which has been applied often in libel cases,105 is of 
little use in both peer-to-peer transaction cases and cyberlibel cases. Calder 
held that jurisdiction was appropriate where the defendant, first, committed 
 
 99. See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text. 
 100. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
 101. See, e.g., Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing 
Zippo on this basis from a suit on a contract for sale between two eBay users). 
 102.  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(emphasis added). 
 103. Id. at 1121 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See, e.g., Miracle v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1068 (D. Haw. 2000) 
(allowing jurisdiction over a libel suit under Calder). 
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intentional actions expressly aimed at the forum state of California, and, 
second, “knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt” by the defendant in 
the forum state of California.106 Once again, when two members of an online 
community contract for an exchange of digital goods or services, the parties’ 
physical location is completely irrelevant. Typically, the parties neither 
expressly aim an act at any particular state nor know in what state the effects of 
that act will be felt. The same is true in cyberlibel cases. A tortfeasor who 
defames a fellow eBay or Etsy user through the site’s reputation system targets 
not a forum state, but an online community. Thus, a case in either category 
would fail both parts of the Calder effects test. 
Since neither of these two approaches is applicable to the problem of 
jurisdiction over online communities, a change in the law is needed. That is, 
either the Supreme Court will have to generate new Fourteenth Amendment 
due process doctrine, or Congress will have to expand the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. 
III.  J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
After the Supreme Court’s most recent decision involving personal 
jurisdiction, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,107 it is highly unlikely 
that this issue will be resolved by the courts. In reversing the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a United Kingdom-based 
manufacturer of a metal-shearing machine,108 Justice Kennedy’s lead opinion 
in J. McIntyre states that the Court’s 1987 decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. 
v. Superior Court109 “may be responsible in part for [the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s] error” and attempts to “provide greater clarity” regarding the stream 
of commerce fact pattern.110 In reality, the Court’s decision does no such thing. 
Much like Asahi, J. McIntyre was a splintered decision that did not definitively 
settle the legal issues raised in the case.111 Once again, there was no majority 
 
 106. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
 107. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 108. Id. at 2785. 
 109. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 110. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion). In this context, the phrase “stream of 
commerce” refers to situations in which the defendant does not personally sell its goods in the 
forum state but “delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
will be purchased in the forum State,” such as by contracting with a third-party distributor who 
sells the products to consumers. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–
98 (1980). Jurisdiction is sometimes, but not always, proper in this type of situation. See id. 
However, the exact contours of this theory have been the source of much confusion since World-
Wide Volkswagen. See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110–11. 
 111. In Asahi, the Court reversed a California court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese 
corporation that manufactured the tire valve assembly that was used to construct a motorcycle tire 
that exploded on a California interstate. 480 U.S. at 108. Though the reversal was unanimous, the 
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opinion in J. McIntyre. Justice Kennedy wrote the lead opinion, joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas.112 Justice Breyer wrote 
a concurrence on behalf of himself and Justice Alito.113 Justice Ginsburg 
dissented for the Court’s three women.114 The plurality and the dissenters, 
among whom no one speaks with the full authority of the Court, espouse 
diametrically opposing views as to the source of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine.115 Even worse for clarity’s sake, the signers of the concurring opinion 
do not articulate any theory of personal jurisdiction at all, preferring to wait for 
a case with better facts before making any bold pronouncements.116 
The facts of J. McIntyre are a fairly typical instance of the stream of 
commerce pattern. J. McIntyre Machinery (“McIntyre UK”) is a United 
Kingdom-based manufacturer of industrial machinery.117 One of McIntyre 
UK’s products, a three-ton metal shearing machine, was sold in New Jersey 
and eventually severed four fingers on New Jersey resident Robert Nicastro’s 
right hand.118 Nicastro then filed a product-liability suit against McIntyre UK 
in a New Jersey state court.119 McIntyre UK sold its products in the United 
States through a U.S.-based distributor, coincidentally named McIntyre 
Machinery America, Ltd. (“McIntyre America”).120 McIntyre UK made no 
secret of its intention to sell its products “to customers throughout the United 
 
nine justices wrote three opinions advocating three separate grounds for reversal. Justice 
O’Connor, speaking for four justices, wrote that even where the stream of commerce carries the 
defendant’s goods into the forum state, jurisdiction requires “an act of the defendant purposefully 
directed toward the forum State,” such as labeling or packaging of the product for the consumer 
base in a particular jurisdiction. Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan 
wrote on behalf of four justices that the stream of commerce fact pattern refers to the “regular and 
anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale” and that the existence 
of a stream of commerce carrying the defendant’s goods to the forum state always supports 
jurisdiction. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Stevens, writing for himself and 
Justices White and Blackmun, who both also concurred in Justice Brennan’s opinion, wrote that 
the Court’s reversal should have been based on the fact that a California court exercising 
jurisdiction over an indemnity suit between a Japanese company and a Taiwanese company 
would be “unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 121–22 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 112. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785. 
 113. Id. at 2791. 
 114. Id. at 2794. 
 115. Compare id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (noting that personal jurisdiction 
hinges on whether a sovereign has authority to render a judgment), with id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (stating that personal jurisdiction is a “function of the individual liberty interest 
preserved by the Due Process Clause”). 
 116. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad 
applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.”). 
 117. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2795. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2786. 
 120. Id. at 2796. 
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States,” and never instructed McIntyre America to avoid selling McIntyre 
UK’s products in any particular region or state.121 In addition, McIntyre UK 
was an exhibitor at a number of nationally attended trade shows in Las Vegas, 
New Orleans, Orlando, San Antonio, and San Francisco.122 McIntyre UK also 
holds U.S. patents for some of its products.123 Justice Ginsburg points out,124 
and the plurality does not dispute,125 that McIntyre UK purposefully availed 
itself of a nationwide market in the United States. However, the machine that 
injured Nicastro was one of only four McIntyre UK products that had ever 
entered the state of New Jersey.126 In addition, no McIntyre UK employee had 
ever set foot in New Jersey.127 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion holds that the New Jersey court’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over McIntyre UK was unconstitutional because of the defendant’s 
lack of contacts with the forum state of New Jersey.128 The key features of 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning are that it employs a “forum-by-forum, or 
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis,” and that it recognizes “the United States 
[as] a distinct sovereign” from any one of the fifty states.129 Consequently, the 
plurality has no difficulty accepting the premise whose perceived injustice 
drives the dissent130—namely, that “a defendant may in principle be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular 
State.”131 Justice Kennedy also quotes his own opinion in U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton,132 in which he famously wrote that the framers “split the atom 
of sovereignty”133 in creating a system with “two orders of government, each 
with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights 
and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”134 For 
 
 121. Id. at 2797. 
 122. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796. 
 123. Id. at 2795. 
 124. Id. at 2796–97 (stating that McIntyre UK’s goal in attending trade shows was to reach 
“anyone interested in the machine from anywhere in the United States” and to “sell [its] machines 
to customers throughout the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 125. Id. at 2790 (“In this case, petitioner directed marketing and sales efforts at the United 
States.”). 
 126. Id. at 2786. 
 127. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
 128. Id. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 129. Id. at 2789. 
 130. See id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Courts . . . have rightly rejected the 
conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products across the USA may evade jurisdiction in any 
and all States, including the State where its defective product is distributed and causes injury.”). 
 131. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 132. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 133. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 134. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Thornton, 514 
U.S. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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Justice Kennedy, the constitutional limits of New Jersey’s jurisdictional power 
are a function of the borders of New Jersey and New Jersey alone, not the 
borders of the United States.135 Stated differently, minimum contacts with one 
sovereign (the United States) do not necessarily suffice as minimum contacts 
with a different sovereign (New Jersey).136 McIntyre UK may have had “an 
intent to serve the U.S. market,” but it did not “purposefully avail[] itself of the 
New Jersey market” because its actions did not “manifest an intention to 
submit to the power of” New Jersey.137 Therefore, the plurality found that New 
Jersey’s exercise of jurisdiction was unconstitutional.138 
The dissenters’ disagreement with the plurality is based on a different view 
of, first, the source of personal jurisdiction doctrine and, second, the 
significance of the defendant’s commercial activities in the United States. 
Justice Ginsburg draws a distinction between state sovereignty and due 
process, and argues that the latter, not the former, per se, is the crux of the 
jurisdictional inquiry.139 Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee,140 cited by the dissent, held that restrictions on state court 
jurisdiction “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.”141 Also cited is Shaffer, which 
stated that “the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States [is not] the central 
concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”142 Thus, the Court need not 
be hung up on state sovereignty concerns in developing and applying the 
International Shoe doctrine, which “gave prime place to reason and 
fairness.”143 Even though Justice Ginsburg rejects the plurality’s contention 
that personal jurisdiction is essentially an issue of state sovereignty, the dissent 
need not be read as rejecting the premise that due process requires a sovereign-
by-sovereign analysis. Rather, the dissent seems to implicitly hold that it is 
improper to conduct the sovereign-by-sovereign analysis as if the fifty 
members of the United States were completely independent nation states, as 
opposed to constituent parts of one federal republic. Justice Ginsburg notes 
that McIntyre UK “dealt with the United States as a single market” and was 
“concerned not with the prospect of suit in State X as opposed to State Y, but 
rather with its subjection to suit anywhere in the United States.”144 McIntyre 
 
 135. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2788, 2790. 
 138. Id. at 2791. 
 139. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 140. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
 141. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 
U.S. at 703 n.10). 
 142. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). 
 143. Id. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 2801. 
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UK’s actions revealed its intention to avail itself of the entire United States 
market, and Justice Ginsburg saw McIntyre UK’s amenability to suit in New 
Jersey, the situs of plaintiff Nicastro’s injury, as a “reasonable cost of 
transacting business internationally.”145 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence disagrees with the plurality’s reasoning but 
abstains from making any broad pronouncements or working any major change 
in personal jurisdiction doctrine.146 For Justices Breyer and Alito, the case 
“requires no more than adhering to [the Court’s] precedents.”147 Under World-
Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, “a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by 
the kind of sales effort indicated here,” is insufficient to support an exercise of 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.148 At the same time, Justice Breyer 
objects to the “plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction rule,” but declines to 
state an alternate theory because “the incident at issue in this case does not 
implicate modern concerns.”149 He raises three hypothetical circumstances that 
illustrate the “modern concerns” that may justify a change in the law: first, a 
company that “targets the world by selling products from its Web site”; 
second, a company that “consigns the products through an intermediary (say, 
Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfill the orders”; and third, a company 
that purchases online advertising “that it knows will be viewed in a forum.”150 
Justice Breyer writes that “[t]hose issues have serious commercial 
consequences but are totally absent in this case.”151 Thus, the concurring 
Justices believe that existing precedents are inadequate to address the realities 
of conducting business through the internet but will wait to update those 
precedents until a better case comes along. 
One of the few points agreed upon by a majority of the Court—the three 
dissenters and the two signers of the concurrence—is that the current state of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, at least as articulated in Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion, is deficient. However, an examination of each opinion reveals that it is 
unlikely that the Court will welcome the concept of cyberspace—i.e., online 
communities as territorial spaces unto themselves—into the personal 
jurisdiction analysis in the foreseeable future. The plurality’s approach, based 
strictly on state sovereignty,152 is not amenable to extending the sovereign 
reach of a state into cyberspace. In fact, based on the plurality opinion’s 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“So I think it unwise to 
announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day 
consequences.”). 
 147. Id. at 2792. 
 148. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 149. Id. at 2792–93. 
 150. Id. at 2793. 
 151. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793. 
 152. See supra notes 128–38 and accompanying text. 
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emphasis on traditional practice,153 those four justices would probably say that 
traditional communities are the only communities that should be considered in 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis. The dissenters favor granting 
state courts greater adjudicatory power over out-of-state defendants than the 
plurality does, but they would do so in this case only because the defendant 
deliberately availed itself of a nationwide market in the United States.154 This 
rationale could not lead to a workable theory of jurisdiction over online 
communities because online interactions are not subject to any geographic 
limitations. A person who does business in an online community almost 
necessarily avails himself or herself of a global market, and would be subject 
to the jurisdiction of any American court.155 This result would do great damage 
to the values of “fair play and substantial justice” and would create 
prohibitively high barriers to entry for e-commerce entrepreneurs. 
Justices Breyer and Alito are the only two justices who seem open to 
creating new doctrine to account for the changes in technology that took place 
in the twenty-four years between Asahi and J. McIntyre.156 With the seven 
other justices opposed to the idea, it seems highly unlikely that the Court will 
incorporate online communities into Fourteenth Amendment due process 
doctrine. 
IV.  IMPLEMENTING A STATUTORY SYSTEM OF JURISDICTION OVER 
CYBERTERRITORY 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in J. McIntyre obliquely refers to the fact that 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k), for state-law claims—which 
include garden-variety contract and defamation claims—the jurisdictional 
reach of the district courts is coextensive with that of state courts.157 
Consequently, as of today, if a non-U.S. defendant avoids jurisdiction in each 
of the fifty states, that defendant has also succeeded in avoiding the jurisdiction 
 
 153. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“Freeform notions 
of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered 
in the absence of authority into law.”). 
 154. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
 155. Justice Breyer raises this concern in concurrence, and seems to prefer some sort of in-
between rule whereby some, but not all, online communications would confer jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant. See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general 
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located . . . .”); J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 
(Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“It may be that . . . Congress could authorize the exercise of 
jurisdiction in appropriate courts. That circumstance is not presented in this case . . . .”). 
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of the federal courts.158 Of course, Congress could, through appropriate 
legislation, expand the jurisdiction of the district courts to the outer boundaries 
of the judicial power of the United States as circumscribed in Article III of the 
Constitution.159 This is the path that Congress must take in order for plaintiffs 
to have reasonable access to the courts to resolve disputes originating in online 
communities. 
This would not be the first jurisdictional issue that Congress has solved 
with legislation specific to one class of cases. The Federal Interpleader Act160 
was passed because of difficulties arising in situations where multiple adverse 
parties have mutually exclusive claims against the same property.161 For 
example, when residents of different states have claims against the same 
insurance policy, the insurer could face an administrative nightmare in 
distributing the insurance fund across multiple forums, and the claimants might 
be prejudiced by preferential settlements.162 To avoid these problems, 
Congress granted the district courts original jurisdiction over interpleader 
actions in situations like the one just described.163 
Included in the Act is a provision for nationwide service of process on any 
interpleader claimant by United States Marshals in the district where the 
claimant is present or domiciled.164 In addition to providing an additional 
forum for relief, the interpleader procedure allows the district courts to grant a 
remedy that none of the state courts could provide.165 The Supreme Court has 
not heard a due process challenge to the Interpleader Act, and the lower courts 
have applied it faithfully.166 Two premises support the conclusion that the Act 
is constitutional. First, in federal court, service of process and personal 
jurisdiction in cases premised on a federal question are governed by Fifth 
Amendment due process rather than Fourteenth Amendment due process.167 
Second, just as Justice Kennedy suggests in J. McIntyre, the Fifth Amendment 
 
 158. Note that for a claim that arises under federal law, Rule 4(k)(2) allows a federal district 
court to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2). For state-law claims, 
however, the defendant will have completely evaded the jurisdiction of American courts in this 
situation. 
 159. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2. 
 160. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (2006). 
 161. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 n.15 (1967). 
 162. See id. at 533 & n.15. 
 163. 28 U.S.C. § 1335. 
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 2361. 
 165. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S. v. Miller, 229 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (D. Minn. 1964) 
(“[I]nterpleader . . . provides a party . . . with a remedy [that] would be unavailable to him in any 
State court.”). 
 166. Robert A. Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the 
Power of the Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1988). 
 167. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 
1085 (1st Cir. 1992). 
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only requires that the defendant have minimum contacts with the United States 
itself, not with any particular state.168 
The problem of jurisdiction over cyberterritory lends itself to a solution 
similar to the Federal Interpleader Act. Congress could pass a statute giving 
district courts jurisdiction over disputes arising in online communities and 
providing for nationwide service of process by United States Marshals. The 
cases addressing Fifth Amendment due process suggest that a federal 
cyberterritorial jurisdiction statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny,169 
so it remains only to decide which district courts should be given jurisdiction 
over which cases. 
As discussed previously, online communities represent commercial 
markets and interactive spaces that are, in some ways, quite similar to 
traditional communities in cities and states.170 The most reasonable way to 
assign jurisdiction over online communities, then, is to copy the rule of 
International Shoe by determining jurisdiction based on a defendant’s 
purposeful availment of the commercial opportunities presented by a particular 
online community. Such purposeful availment could be established by 
evidence that the defendant deliberately marketed and sold his or her goods or 
services in that online community, or by evidence that the defendant 
deliberately established a presence in that community for the purpose of selling 
goods or services to members of that community. 
But even if cyberspace is territory in a sense that is relevant to personal 
jurisdiction, it is not the territory of a governmental entity with its own court 
system. How, then, should purposeful availment of an online community 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Professor Lusardi suggests that the Interpleader Act may still be unconstitutional because 
“one might . . . argue that due process requires a reasonably convenient forum” in complex, 
multistate cases that may require defendants to appear in states with which they have had no 
contacts. Lusardi, supra note 166, at 16. However, Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. 
McIntyre—of the three opinions, the one with the most restrictive view of personal jurisdiction—
frames federal court jurisdiction as a matter of contacts with the sovereign, not as a matter of 
convenience. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (Kennedy, J., 
plurality opinion) (“For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with the United 
States Government but not with the government of any individual State.” (emphasis added)). 
Furthermore, courts have noted that the International Shoe doctrine is not applicable to a federal 
court lawfully authorized to effect nationwide service of process. See Med. Mut. of Ohio v. 
deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the nationwide service of process provision 
in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). In such a situation, the federal court has nationwide 
jurisdiction, not extra-territorial jurisdiction as in cases governed by International Shoe. Id. In 
other words, the territorial substrate of a district court in the Eastern District of Missouri is 
actually the entire United States, not just the eastern half of Missouri. Thus, the role played by 
convenience in the International Shoe doctrine is irrelevant to the Interpleader Act’s satisfaction 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
 170. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. 
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translate into a grant of jurisdiction to a particular court? It would make little 
sense to give jurisdiction to the state in which the servers running a website 
associated with that community are located (assuming such a website even 
exists). Nor should jurisdiction be given to the state that is home to the 
business or individual that developed the website associated with the 
community. If cyberspace truly is a non-physical space, and if a person’s 
location in cyberspace is a function of the person’s online activities as opposed 
to the geographic location from which the person accesses the internet, then the 
jurisdictional question cannot be resolved by reference to the geographic 
location of the website operators or their property.171 
Almost by definition, the problem of tying down an online community to a 
particular geographic location is intractable. Cyberspace is not located within, 
nor does it intersect with, any country or state. Nonetheless, the goals of 
fairness and convenience to litigants would be best served by a limited and 
controlled expansion of the federal courts’ jurisdiction over disputes arising 
out of online communities. I propose that Congress mandate that the operators 
of an online community hub, defined as a website or other communication 
service, such as an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel or an online gaming 
platform, that is designed to facilitate interactions among its users, select one 
or more federal districts as the community’s designated forum district(s) for 
jurisdictional purposes. The service’s operators would be required to publish 
this selection in the terms and conditions that govern use of the service. Then 
the jurisdictional statute would provide that purposeful availment of an online 
community confers upon federal district courts in the website’s designated 
forum districts jurisdiction over any dispute arising from interactions taking 
place within that online community. While there will be details to work out,172 
this approach would strike a fair and manageable balance between defendants’ 
need to be free from the jurisdiction of faraway states and plaintiffs’ need for 
access to a convenient forum for relief.173 
 
 171. Suppose that a dispute arises in a mining town that owes its existence to the corporation 
that owns the mining operation. Would it make sense to adjudicate that dispute in the state where 
the corporation is headquartered? 
 172. Congress may wish to consider requiring operators to select a minimum number of 
districts. Perhaps operators should be required to choose a number of districts so that any plaintiff 
in the continental United States will be within a certain distance of a designated forum district. 
 173. The cyberterritorial theory need not be the only theory applied to lawsuits between 
members of online communities. In some situations, there might exist a rationale independent of 
the cyberterritorial jurisdiction statute that could justify the exercise of state court jurisdiction 
under International Shoe. For example, if two members of an online community maintain a long-
term contractual relationship, one party, the defendant-to-be, may learn the geographic location of 
the other party, the plaintiff-to-be. If the contractual relationship is one that has a substantial 
impact on a business enterprise based in the eventual plaintiff’s home state, then the plaintiff 
might be able to sue in his or her home state under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. See 471 U.S. 
462, 487 (1985) (allowing jurisdiction based on the parties’ “substantial and continuing 
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The complexity of online communities creates two challenges in applying 
the cyberterritorial model to the facts of a particular case. On one hand, it may 
be difficult to tell in some cases whether a given communication took place 
within the borders of a given online community or not. Interactions within an 
online community are not always limited to a single electronic medium. Just as 
a collective of political activists might meet at coffee shops, parks, and private 
homes in addition to exchanging information via telephone, print newsletters, 
and flyers, members of an online community might communicate via 
discussion forums, comment threads on blog postings, social media sites, IRC 
channels, and dedicated community websites.174 Each of these modes of 
communication may or may not be considered an “official” part of the 
community. In light of these complexities, it may be quite difficult for courts to 
decide whether a given communication did or did not take place in the online 
community in question. 
On the other hand, it may be difficult to decide which one of several online 
communities was the one in which the cause of action arose. For any given 
subject, there could be countless separate and distinct online communities 
dedicated to that subject, and the chances are high that two individuals with a 
shared interest might have occasion to interact with each other in more than 
one such online community.175 If the communications that led up to events 
creating a cause of action took place in multiple communities, more than one 
community might possibly be the cyberterritorial unit in which the cause of 
action arose.176 
 
relationship” and the defendant’s receipt of “fair notice from the contract documents and the 
course of dealing” that he might be haled into court in Florida). 
 174. For example, some subreddits have official IRC chat channels. See, e.g., Sysadmin, 
REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin (last visited May 23, 2012) (subreddit “dedicated to 
the profession of Computer System Administration”). 
 175. A quick Google search for “woodworking forum,” for example, yields a list of dozens of 
online communities dedicated to woodworking. See Search Results for Woodworking Forum, 
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/#output=search&q=woodworking+forum (last visited May 23, 
2012). 
 176. To complicate the matter even further, communities can be nested within other 
communities. While many subreddits have their own rules of conduct, Reddit as a whole has 
certain rules that apply globally across all subreddits. See Reddiquette, REDDIT, http://www.red 
dit.com/help/reddiquette (last visited May 23, 2012). Both sets of rules can be equally significant, 
as they can equally be the products of a community’s shared values. For example, one of Reddit’s 
best-known global rules is that posting another user’s personal information will result in an 
immediate and permanent ban because “witch hunts and vigilantism hurt innocent people too 
often.” Id. To avoid the potential complications of a community existing with another 
community, it may be best for the cyberterritorial jurisdiction statute to hold that purposeful 
availment of a second-level community constitutes purposeful availment of the overall 
community. In the case of Reddit, this would mean that a defendant’s purposeful availment of the 
commercial market in a single subreddit would confer jurisdiction over that defendant to Reddit’s 
designated forum states. 
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Of these two problems, the latter is much easier to resolve. If multiple 
communities are sufficiently connected to the cause of action to warrant 
jurisdiction, then the defendant should be deemed amenable to suit in all of the 
communities’ chosen forums. The former problem will undoubtedly prove 
more challenging. However, there is no reason to think that this problem would 
completely prevent the cyberterritorial model from succeeding. There will be 
difficult cases under the cyberterritorial model just as there are in cases 
involving only traditional geographic communities,177 but the cyberterritorial 
model will prepare the courts for the potential influx of cyberspace litigation 
with a consistent framework to properly balance the interests of plaintiffs and 
defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, personal jurisdiction rules have become more 
nuanced to reflect the increasing complexities of modern life. E-commerce is 
the latest reality that the courts have attempted to accommodate in the 
International Shoe doctrine.178 The next major cultural development that will 
require a change in the law is that of online communities. Litigation between 
members of online communities has been sparse up until now, but it is almost a 
foregone conclusion that peer-to-peer transactions in online communities will 
increase in number, giving rise to a greater number of potential cyberspace 
disputes. Virtually all of these lawsuits will raise legitimate questions about 
which courts have personal jurisdiction over which defendants.179 It behooves 
Congress to implement a cyberterritorial model of jurisdiction now so as to 
avoid confusion and inefficiencies when the lower courts are faced with the 
task of resolving these issues. Implementing this jurisdictional system soon 
will give Congress and the courts an opportunity to experiment with different 
variations on the cyberterritorial theory180 before online transactions produce a  
 
 177. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“[In the International Shoe test,] 
few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the 
shades are innumerable.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 178. See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text. 
 179. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (“Whether a 
person or entity is subject to the jurisdiction of a state court . . . is a question that arises with great 
frequency in the routine course of litigation.”). 
 180. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
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deluge of litigation. Hopefully, the judicial system will be able to sidestep the 
confusion that has resulted from decisions like Asahi181 and J. McIntyre182 and 
move directly to a clear and reasonable set of jurisdictional principles. 
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